Mokshadharma Parva — Question by Yudhishthira about virtues and duties

Yudhisthira said You say that virtue or duty depends upon delicate consideration, that it is marked out by the conduct of the good, that it is fraught with restraints, and that its characteristics are also contained in the Vedas. It appears to me, however, that I have a certain inward light by virtue of which I can differentiate between right and wrong by inferences.

Numberless questions which I had wished to ask you have all been answered by you. There is one question, however, that I shall just now put. It is not prompted, O king, by desire of mere discussion.

All these embodied creatures, it seems, take birth, exist, and renounce their bodies, of their own nature. Duty and its opposite, therefore, cannot be determined, O Bharata, by study of the scriptures alone.

The duties of a rich person are of one sort. Those of a person who has fallen into distress are of another sort. How can duty in the time of poverty be determined by reading the scriptures alone?

The acts of the good, as you have said, form virtue. The good, however, are to be known by their acts. The definition, therefore, has at the bottom a begging of the question, and the result is that what is meant by conduct of the good remains unsettled.

It is seen that some ordinary man commits sin while apparently achieving virtue. Some extraordinary person again may be seen who achieves virtue by committing acts which are seemingly sinful.

Then, again, the proof has been given by even those who are well-conversant with the scriptures themselves, for we have heard that the ordinances of the Vedas disappear gradually in every successive cycle. The duties in the Krita age are of one sort. Those in the Treta are of another sort, and those in the Dvapara are of a different sort. The duties in the Kali age, again, are entirely of a different character. It seems, therefore, that duties have been sanctioned for the respective cycles according to the powers of human beings in the different ages.

When, therefore, all the declarations in the Vedas do not suit equally all the ages, the saying that the Vedas are true is only a popular parlance given vent to for popular satisfaction. whose range From the Shrutis have originated the Smritis is very wide.

If the Vedas be considered authoritative everywhere, then the Smritis also would be considered authoritative, for the latter are based on the former. But when the Shrutis and the Smritis contradict each other, how can either be authoritative.

Then, again, it is seen, that when some wicked wights of great power cause certain portions of religious acts to be stopped, these are destroyed for ever.

Whether we know it or not, whether we are able to determine it or not, the course of duty is sharper than the edge of a razor and grosser than even a mountain.

Virtue at first appears in the form of the romantic house of vapour seen in the distant sky. When, however, it is examined by the ! learned, it disappears.

Like the small ponds at which cattle drink or the shallow canals along cultivated fields, that dry up very soon, the eternal practices laid down in the Smrities, falling into discontinuance, at last disappear for good.

Amongst good men, some are seen to become hypocrites by allowing themselves to be moved by desire. Some become so, desiring by others. Many others tread in the same path, moved by various other motives of a similar nature.

It cannot be gainsaid that such acts are righteous. Fools, again, hold that virtue is an empty sound among those called good. They ridicule such persons and consider them as men bereft of reason.

Many great men, again, neglecting the duties of their own order, follow those of the Kshatriyas. No such conduct, therefore, is to be seen, which is for universal benevolence.

By a certain action, one becomes really meritorious. The same actions prevent another from the acquisition of merit. Another, by performing those actions at his pleasure, it is seen, remains unchanged.

Thus that action by which one reaps merit, obstructs another in the acquisition of merit. One may thus seen that all actions are not peculiar in motive and character.

It seems, therefore, that only that which the learned of old denominated righteousness is righteousness to this day; and through that course of conduct the distinctions and limitations have become eternal.